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 FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND BLACK VOTER TURNOUT 
MICHAELA CUSHING-DANIELS  
ABSTRACT 
State laws disenfranchising felons and ex-felons have existed in many American states 
since before the Civil War. However, in the aftermath of the Civil War, new, more severe 
restrictions were passed as part of the Jim Crowe Era laws aimed at preventing black 
citizens from exercising their new rights. While many of these laws were eventually 
stricken down by Supreme Court decisions, felon disenfranchisement provisions survived 
scrutiny. This opened the door for white backlash against the gains made by the Civil 
Rights Movement of the 1960s and ‘70s to manifest itself via the development of the 
massive prison industrial system over the last 40 years. This paper’s inquiry is focused on 
the political consequences of the huge racial discrepancies in criminal justice outcomes in 
the United States, specifically on whether the disenfranchisement of felons and ex-felons 
depresses turnout among eligible black voters. I use an analysis of black voter turnout 
and its relationship to the severity of state disenfranchisement laws from 1980 through 
2016 to explore three hypotheses related to these effects. The results suggest that, when 
all or most ex-felons are disenfranchised, the resulting dilution of the political efficacy 
and power of the communities into which they re-enter depresses turnout among eligible 
black voters in those communities. Additionally, I find evidence of significant depression 
in eligible black turnout in Southern states, suggesting the need for further investigation 
into the perpetuation of racial inequalities in specific geographic loci in the United States. 
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 In the aftermath of the Civil War, a set of amendments to the United States 
Constitution were passed with the aim of overcoming the barriers slave states had put in 
place to prevent former slaves from exercising citizenship rights. These amendments 
granted the rights of citizenship to all former slaves, established that they had the right to 
equal protection under the laws of state and federal governments, and extended the 
franchise to black men.  However, backlash against these new federal measures led state 
governments, particularly in the former confederacy, to pass a slew of other laws 
imposing strict requirements on voter eligibility and led white agitators to employ violent 
intimidation tactics to prevent black citizens from exercising their new franchise. While 
many of these discriminatory laws and practices were stricken down by Supreme Court 
decisions that made barriers to voting like literacy tests and poll taxes illegal, one of the 
subtler legal barriers to black voting, felon disenfranchisement, survived scrutiny.  
This is problematic because it opened the door for white backlash against the 
gains made by the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and ‘70s to manifest itself via the 
development of the massive prison industrial system over the last 40 years. The huge 
racial discrepancies in criminal justice outcomes in the United States have socially and 
economically crippled many black communities across the country. This paper’s inquiry 
is focused on the political consequences of these inequities, specifically on whether the 
disenfranchisement of felons and ex-felons depresses turnout among eligible black 
voters. I use an analysis of black voter turnout and its relationship to the severity of state 
disenfranchisement laws from 1980 through 2016 to explore three hypotheses related to 
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these effects. First, I hypothesize that increases in the severity of a state’s felon 
disenfranchisement law will depress turnout among that state’s eligible black voters. 
Second, I hypothesize that states with more severe disenfranchisement laws experience 
more depressed turnout than states with less severe laws. Finally, I hypothesize that the 
magnitude of turnout depression is greater in states historically associated with targeted 
disenfranchisement of black citizens.  
Section one provides an overview of the historical disenfranchisement of felons in 
the United States. Sections two and three explore previous empirical research on the 
political psychology of black voters and provides evidence for why one would expect 
felon disenfranchisement laws to have effects on eligible voters. Section four reviews my 
hypotheses, section five describes my data, and section six reviews my methods and 
results. 
1 - Felon Disenfranchisement: A Brief History 
Felon disenfranchisement laws are not new, nor are they unique to the United 
States. “Civil Death” is a concept that can be traced to the ancient Greeks and which is 
widely accepted today in many democratic countries as one of the consequences of 
committing a crime. In fact, many U.S. states had felon disenfranchisement provisions in 
their constitutions prior to the Civil War. However, in the immediate aftermath of the 
Civil War, Southern politics were defined by the political impacts of former Confederate 
states using their disproportionate influence to serve narrow regional interests and 
develop the powerful “solid south.” Manza and Uggen discuss how the dominance of 
 3 
Southern Democratic leadership in Congress developed into the modern, Republican-
controlled “solid South,” and how these states’ representatives have proved crucial in 
defeating efforts to re-enfranchise ex-felons.7  
Southern and former Confederate states also have some of the strictest felon 
disenfranchisement laws. Many of these laws were part of a wave of restrictions on 
voting in Southern states following the Civil War and, in some cases, the passage of the 
Civil War Amendments.8 While many of the other restrictions on voting passed during 
this time were removed by a series of Supreme Court decisions and the provisions of the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Supreme Court upheld felon disenfranchisement laws as 
legal, and the Voting Rights Act excluded “those participating in rebellion and other 
crimes” from its provisions. While these laws were upheld in part because of their “race 
neutral” language, Manza and Uggen show that the racial composition of states’ prison 
populations impacted states’ adoption of more severe felon disenfranchisement 
provisions, particularly in the South.9 While the severity of state statutes about felon 
disenfranchisement have varied over time, it has generally been the case that Southern 
states’ laws have been more severe, disenfranchising not only those in prisons, but many 
or all ex-felons as well.10 The use of prisons to subjugate felons for the economic gain of 
southern states in the post-Civil War era laid the groundwork for the current prison 
                                                 
7 Manza, J., & Uggen, Christopher. (2006). Locked out felon disenfranchisement and 
American democracy (Studies in crime and public policy). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 48. 
8 Ibid. 51 
9 Ibid. 65 
10 See Appendix B. 
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industrial state that has developed largely in response to the advancements in black 
political power during and after the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and ‘70s.11 
Felon disenfranchisement laws have been carried over from the Jim Crow era to the 
modern American carceral state, and have contributed to the perpetuation of the 
systematic exclusion of black men in particular from political participation and agency.12 
2 – The Dynamics of Group Identity Politics and Black Turnout 
In the United States, approximately 1.4 million black men are disenfranchised 
because of a current or former felony conviction. They make up almost half of the voting-
age population who are ineligible to vote because of a felony conviction,20 despite the 
fact that blacks only make up about twelve percent of the United States population as a 
whole. The racially disproportionate criminal justice outcomes in the United States are 
not a new subject; many authors have written about the ways of mass incarceration has 
diluted the political and economic agency of black communities in general.21 While felon 
                                                 
11 Forman, J. (2017). Locking up our own : Crime and punishment in black 
America (First ed.). New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
12 Jennifer Rae Taylor, "Constitutionally Unprotected: Prison Slavery, Felon 
Disenfranchisement, and the Criminal Exception to Citizenship Rights," Gonzaga Law 
Review 47, no. 2 (2011-2012): 365-376 
20 J. Whyatt Mondesire, "Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax," Temple 
Political & Civil Rights Law Review 10, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 439. 
21 See: Anonymous. (1989). The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, 
Criminality, and "The Purity of the Ballot Box". Harvard Law Review, 102(6), 1317.; J. 
Whyatt Mondesire, "Felon Disenfranchisement: The Modern Day Poll Tax," Temple 
Political & Civil Rights Law Review 10, no. 2 (Spring 2001); Forman, J. (2017). Locking 
up our own : Crime and punishment in black America (First ed.). New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux.; Jennifer Rae Taylor, "Constitutionally Unprotected: Prison Slavery, 
Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Criminal Exception to Citizenship Rights," Gonzaga 
Law Review 47, no. 2 (2011-2012): 365-392 
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disenfranchisement policies have been upheld by the Supreme Court because they only 
target those who have committed crimes and the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting 
Rights Act both explicitly exempt from protection all those “participating in rebellion or 
other crimes,” these policies’ diluting effects may affect the behavior of eligible voters, 
which has serious political implications.  
There are several reasons to expect that more severe felon disenfranchisement 
laws lead to the dilution of the eligible black vote. Meredith Rolfe’s social theory of voter 
turnout is a useful place to begin. Generally speaking, her theory posits that voters make 
political decisions conditioned on their social networks, and she suggests that the 
decision to turnout to vote is a social dilemma. In other words, people are significantly 
responsive to the behavior of those around them when it comes to turning out to vote.22 
This has several implications for this paper’s investigation. If the voting power of a 
state’s black voting-age population is being severely diluted via disqualification by felon 
and ex-felon disenfranchisement provisions, it is reasonable to predict that the exclusion 
of felons and ex-felons from political life will have ripple effects on their immediate 
social networks, especially if they are working to re-enter community life after their 
release. Eligible voters living in communities heavily affected by crime and law and 
order politics may therefore also be affected by the dilution of political efficacy in these 
areas. 
                                                 
22 Rolfe, M. (2012). Voter turnout : A social theory of political participation (Political 
economy of institutions and decisions). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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Other research provides further insight into the effects of social voting and 
community efficacy on black turnout specifically. In “Psychological Involvement and 
Black Voter Turnout,” Maurice Magnum finds evidence that group political efficacy may 
matter more in a black voter’s decision to turn out than that person’s individual political 
efficacy.23 That is, black voters in communities who believe that they, as a community, 
can make a difference in politics or that their representatives respond to their policy 
preferences are more likely to turnout to vote than black voters living in communities that 
do not have this belief. Additionally, Anthony T. Pescosolido provides evidence that 
group efficacy has significant, positive impacts on other measures of group success and 
effectiveness such as individual member willingness to continue as a group, individual 
learning and self-development while participating in the group, and the ability to work 
independently as a member of the group.27  In particular, the strong relationship between 
group efficacy and the development of individual efficacy and ability to work 
independently as a member of a group suggests that potential voters in black 
communities with higher levels of political efficacy should be expected to turn out at 
higher rates than those with lower efficacy because of these characteristics.  
Related research suggests that in more racially segregated areas, black political 
efficacy – defined as the ability of black communities to elect officials who vote in favor 
of legislation supported by black voters – is diminished as a result of more conservative 
                                                 
23 Mangum, Maurice. 2003. “Psychological Involvement and Black Voter 
Turnout.” Political Research Quarterly56(1): 44. 
27 Pescosolido, A. (2003). Group Efficacy And Group Effectiveness. Small Group 
Research, 34(1), 34. 
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attitudes among non-black voters.28 Areas with higher levels of racial segregation (like 
large cities) are often the same areas in which black communities have been targeted 
more generally by law enforcement as areas with higher crime.30 The subsequently high 
rates of incarceration, police surveillance, and high numbers of felons and ex-felons in 
these communities contribute to the ostracization of black communities from society at 
large and to the dilution of black political efficacy within these larger communities. It is 
likely that the mutually reinforcing effects of racial segregation and high incarceration 
rates contribute to the more conservative attitudes of non-black voters in these more 
segregated communities, and drive down voter turnout rates in these ostracized black 
communities.31 Severe disenfranchisement laws exacerbate this ostracization by 
preventing felons and ex-felons from participating in community political agendas, and 
hinder the rehabilitation of these individuals in areas where racial discrimination may 
already compound the effects of incarceration on community re-entry and political 
efficacy.  
There is also new and interesting work on the demobilizing effects of 
incarceration on black turnout that suggests eligible black voters turn out at much lower 
rates after being incarcerated for a misdemeanor (a non-disenfranchising crime) than 
                                                 
28 Ananat, & Washington. (2009). Segregation and Black political efficacy. Journal of 
Public Economics, 93(5), 815. 
30 Tonry, M. (2011). Punishing race : A continuing American dilemma (Studies in crime 
and public policy). New York: Oxford University Press. 8. 
31 Gottschalk, M. (2015). Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American 
Politics (Course Book.. ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 248. 
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eligible white voters.32 This provides further evidence of the demobilizing effects of 
incarceration on turnout, and that extended effects on political and civic participation 
may have stronger effects for black communities than for white communities.33 The mix 
of qualitative and quantitative evidence cited above provides ample reason to suspect that 
black voters rely on their group identity and sense of agency when they engage as 
political actors, and support for the idea that the dilution of this agency and the political 
efficacy of these communities via incarceration and felon disenfranchisement may 
depress turnout among eligible black voters.36 
3 – Political Empowerment and Expression 
 Apart from the connections between efficacy and turnout, theories on the 
relationship between political empowerment and expressive voting are relevant to this 
paper’s inquiry. In their work on black empowerment, Bobo and Gillam provide evidence 
that political empowerment – or the extent to which a group has achieved representation 
and influence over decision making in politics – drives black mobilization. Specifically, 
they found evidence that where blacks hold more positions of authority, wield political 
power, and have done so for longer periods of time, greater numbers of blacks engage in 
some sociopolitical involvement.”37 However, at the national level, there have only been 
                                                 
32 White, Ariel. Working Paper. “Misdemeanor Disenfranchisement? The demobilizing 
effects of brief jail spells on potential voters”. 1. 
33 Gottschalk, M. (2015). Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American 
Politics (Course Book.. ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 247. 
36 Ibid. 248. 
37 Bobo, L., & Gilliam, F. (1990). Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black 
Empowerment. American Political Science Review,84(2), 377. 
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155 black candidates elected to the House of Representatives, 10 elected to the U.S. 
Senate, and one elected as President of the United States. There must, therefore, be 
something different that motivates black voters to continually turn out. 
Other research on voter turnout suggest that voting has expressive returns – that 
is, voters derive utility from voting to express their political beliefs and preferences, and 
thereby re-establish or reaffirm their personal political identities. The political 
implications of this model are important to a broader discussion of the potential spill-over 
effects of felon disenfranchisement laws on eligible black voter turnout. The expressive 
voting model predicts that voters attach themselves to collectives, in which the utility of 
voting comes largely from one’s identity as a member of that collective. This utility is in 
part determined by the number of other voters making up that collective and the aspects 
of identity that connect members of the collective.38 However, research shows that 
“citizens who have experienced the strong arm of the state… remove themselves from 
virtually all avenues of civic expression… do not band together with others facing the 
same issues and needs in their communities, [and] do not turn to their representatives in 
office to resolve pressing political problems.”39 This research also suggests other black 
citizens who have not been imprisoned, but who see themselves as part of a community 
targeted by law-enforcement view government as something to be avoided, and so 
                                                 
38 Schuessler, A. (2000). EXPRESSIVE VOTING. Rationality and Society, 12(1), 87-
119. 
39 Lerman, Amy E., and Vesla M. Weaver. Arresting Citizenship : The Democratic 
Consequences of American Crime Control, University of Chicago Press, 2014. ProQuest 
Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/BU/detail.action?docID=3038581. 
201. 
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remove themselves from venues for political expression to avoid potential interactions 
with law enforcement or government agents that could lead to incarceration. The 
implication is clear – if much of the utility in voting comes in part from the utility of 
expressing one’s membership to a political collective, but collectives of black voters 
connect themselves to the stigmas attached to the commission of crimes, then high 
numbers of disenfranchised citizens in states with more severe disenfranchisement laws 
will dilute the expressive utility of voting, and may depress turnout among members of 
their communities who are still eligible to vote.  
Additionally, Bobo and Gillam point out that other hindrances to black 
empowerment like social segregation and persistent economic disadvantages are still 
present and effect black political identity and participation. These barriers are associated 
with the same phenomena that have resulted in the racial disparities in criminal justice 
outcomes. It has been generally found that high socio-economic status and high 
educational attainment are connected to higher voter turnout.40 However, black 
Americans have the lowest median household income of any race-group in the United 
States, and only 30% of black adults in the United States had completed a Bachelor’s 
degree or more in 2015 (compared to almost 45% of white adults).41 These disparities, 
along with the association of low-income, low-education black Americans with high 
crime rates, provide interesting evidence to suggest the collective identity of black 
                                                 
40 Verba, S., & Nie, Norman H. (1972). Participation in America: Political democracy 




Americans may not lend itself to high voter turnout. Richard Timpone addresses the 
historical perpetuation of these barriers by pointing out that the Civil Rights Movement 
of the 1960s and ‘70s marked a change in the goals of black mobilization, and thus in the 
tactics used to dilute their political power. In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War 
and throughout the Jim Crow Era, black mobilization was focused on voter registration 
and turnout, but as many of the social and legal barriers to black voting were removed via 
Supreme Court decisions and the Voting Rights Act, “the focus of voting discrimination 
shifted from preventing blacks from registering to vote to preventing them from winning 
elections.” According to Timpone, “[as] efforts to limit the franchise were made illegal, 
many southern states responded with resistance plans to dilute the influence of the black 
vote.”42 Felon disenfranchisement laws, having been consistently upheld by the Supreme 
Court, provided a perfect avenue through which to perpetuate this dilution. 
At this point, Supreme Court decisions became crucial in blocking (or failing to 
block) these new discriminatory tactics aimed at diluting the influence of the black vote. 
While the Voting Rights Act was instrumental in expanding the franchise to black 
Americans, the Court’s decisions to uphold felon disenfranchisement provisions may 
depress turnout, not only by reducing the number of potential voters, but by negatively 
affecting eligible black voters who have the franchise but choose not to use it. 
Specifically, by allowing felons to be excluded from exercising the franchise despite the 
racial disparities in imprisonment rates and the relationship between incarceration and 
                                                 
42 Timpone, R. (1997). The Voting Rights Act and Electoral Empowerment: The Case of 
Mississippi. Social Science Quarterly, 78(1), 179. 
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social inequalities more generally, the prison industrial system has continued to 
exacerbate these inequalities and dilute the voting power of eligible voters. 
4 – Hypotheses  
Drawing on the literature cited above, this paper’s inquiry is focused on three 
main hypotheses, summarized in Table A. First, given the evidence from previous 
literature that black voters’ decisions to turnout hinge significantly on the political 
efficacy of their communities, I expect felon and ex-felon disenfranchisement laws will 
have negative effects on black turnout among those still eligible to vote. Second, given 
that more severe laws disenfranchise larger and larger subsets of people that have been 
released from prison and re-entered community life, I expect that if the effects of states’ 
felon disenfranchisement laws are non-linear, depression effects in states with more 
severe disenfranchisement laws will be greater. Finally, given the historical prevalence of 
race politics and previous attempts to disenfranchise black voters in some states, I 
hypothesize that felon disenfranchisement laws will have stronger effects on eligible 
black turnout in states historically associated with targeted disenfranchisement of black 
citizens.  
Table A: Hypotheses 
H1 Felon disenfranchisement laws depress turnout among eligible black voters. 
H2 
If the effects of states’ felon disenfranchisement laws are non-linear, 
depression effects in states with more severe disenfranchisement laws will 
be greater. 
H3 
The magnitude of turnout depression is greater in states historically 




The unit of observation for this paper is an individual state for each year in my 
study. The dependent variable is black voter turnout, measured as a percentage of the 
voting-eligible population. This data come from the United States Census’ Voter Turnout 
tables; I confirm that they measured my population of interest (eligible voters) over the 
phone with a representative from the Current Population Survey. By using each state’s 
voting-eligible population, as opposed to its voting-age population, I can measure the 
indirect effect of felon disenfranchisement laws depressing eligible voter turnout, as 
opposed to the direct effect of these laws decreasing the number of eligible black voters 
in a given state. I use state-level data because I am interested in the demobilizing effects 
on eligible black voters of the severity of a state’s felon disenfranchisement laws, and 
variation in law severity is at the state level. Additionally, over 80% of Americans 
currently in prison are held in state institutions, making state laws on disenfranchisement 
the most appropriate way to measure the effects of felon disenfranchisement on the 
demobilization of eligible black voters.47 
The independent variable in my study is a felon disenfranchisement law severity 
score assigned to each state, which I measure on a scale of zero to five.** The meaning of 
each score is as follows: 
 
                                                 
47 Muller, & Wildeman. (2016). Geographic Variation in the Cumulative Risk of 
Imprisonment and Parental Imprisonment in the United States. Demography, 53(5), 1499. 
** Scores do not take into account disenfranchisement for felonies involving election 
fraud because most states disenfranchise perpetrators of those crimes for life, regardless 
of its disenfranchisement policy for other felonies. 
 14 
0 - No disenfranchisement 
 
1 - Disenfranchisement of felons until end of prison sentence 
 
2 - Disenfranchisement of felons until end of parole or probation 
 
2.5 – Disenfranchisement of felons until end of parole and probation 
 
3 - Rights of all ex-felons felons restored w/in period of time after 
sentencing  
 
4 - Rights of some* ex-felons never restored - need to apply on individual 
basis 
 
4.5 - Rights of all ex-felons never restored - need to apply on individual 
basis 
 
5 - Rights never restored for ex-felons 
 
I  score felon disenfranchisement laws in this way because no state-level turnout 
research has adequately captured the variation in felon disenfranchisement law severity. 
While Thomas Miles finds that “ex-felon disenfranchisement has no impact on state-level 
voter turnout,” a stark limitation in Miles’ study is that he uses a binary variable for felon 
disenfranchisement laws to measure whether or not states disenfranchise ex-felons.48 He 
admits himself that this binary measure fails to fully capture the state-level variation in 
the severity of disenfranchisement laws over time, and it is therefore insufficient for 
capturing the effect of these laws on eligible black voter turnout that I investigate. I add 
half-steps to the variable in order to account for slight changes in variation that I felt did 
not change the law’s severity enough to warrant a full step difference. I compress and 
                                                 
* some indicating that the disqualifying felonies are listed, or all second+ time offenders 
48 Miles, T. (2004). Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout. The Journal of Legal 
Studies, 33(1), 92-94. 
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expand this coding scheme into a four- and seven-point scale as well in order to check for 
robustness in my results.49 
State-level data are appropriate for this investigation because previous research 
has shown that the “distribution of disenfranchised felons varies enormously by state, 
race, and ethnicity because of great variations in state disenfranchisement statutes and 
state incarceration rates.”50 Changes in state laws over time provide the variation in felon 
disenfranchisement that allows me to capture the relationship between these laws and 
voter turnout among the state’s eligible-to-vote black population. Because many states 
experienced significant change in the severity of their felon disenfranchisement laws over 
time (for example Maryland has a high score of 4.5 and a low score of one, Texas has a 
high score of 4.5 and a low score of 2.5, and seven states’ scores change more than four 
times during my time frame of interest), the model can employ state fixed effects to 
control for all observed and unobserved time-invariant state characteristics that might 
also affect black turnout rates. I also control for state-level variation in other population 
demographics that may be correlated with voter turnout using data from the Annual 
Population Survey the Census Bureau conducts in March. I rely on the Census’ measures 
for turnout; and so am limited by any error that may have occurred in their collection 
methods. Additionally, some states’ black populations are so small that they are excluded 
from percentages in the Census’ data. Finally, to account for external factors that may 
                                                 
49 See Appendix D. 
50 Gottschalk, M. (2015). Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American 
Politics (Course Book.. ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
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drive changes in black turnout from election to election, the models also include year 
fixed effects. 
I control for several other state characteristics that I expect to be related to black 
voter turnout. I control for the percent of the state population that is black because I 
anticipate that, given the importance of community to black turnout, being a state with a 
higher number of black residents will have positive effects on turnout. I also control for 
the median age of the state’s black population because age is independently correlated to 
voter turnout. Additionally, I control for the percentage of black residents that live in 
rural areas as an indicator of urbanization because I expect that there are differences in 
mobilization and group efficacy that may affect turnout in rural versus in urban areas. I 
also control for the percentage of black residents that have completed “some college” in 
each state because not only is higher educational attainment related to increased voter 
turnout more generally, educational deficits are also related to inequalities in 
incarceration rates, especially across racial lines.51 
Finally, to test my third hypothesis, I also code for three interaction variables, 
defining three different subsets of states historically associated with disenfranchising 
black citizens. Most broadly, black Americans have faced targeted disenfranchisement in 
Southern states. For this reason, and because these states have the strictest felon 
disenfranchisement laws on average, I include an interaction variable for Southern states. 
However, the census includes the states of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, Oklahoma, 
                                                 
51 Tonry, M. (2011). Punishing race : A continuing American dilemma (Studies in crime 
and public policy). New York: Oxford University Press. 
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and West Virginia in its definition of the Southern region, and previous research has 
suggested that there are significant differences between former Confederate states and 
these “rim states.” Given the particular importance of race in the development of felon 
disenfranchisement laws in the former Confederacy, particularly during the 
Reconstruction Era, I also code for an interaction variable for states in the former 
Confederacy. Finally, if the relationship between felon disenfranchisement laws and 
eligible black turnout in states hinges on a historical legacy of targeted 
disenfranchisement of black voters, it is prudent to also include an interaction variable for 
those states targeted by the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for their intentional use of state 
laws to dilute black political power. I test for these geographic differences to attempt to 
capture a more detailed description of the relationship between felon disenfranchisement 
and eligible black voter turnout. For a full codebook, see Appendix C. 
Methods and Results 
To create a workable dataset, I created a table in which I recorded black voter 
turnout (as a percentage of the eligible black population) from the Census tables for all 
election years for each state for which data is available. As mentioned previously, I had 
to exclude some states because their black populations were too small for their 
registration and voting data to be recorded by the Census. Then, using many sources 
including news stories, legal reviews, and empirical research studies from the Lexis 
Nexis database, I recorded a felon disenfranchisement score for each state for each year 
from 1980 to 2016 to record all changes in the severity of each state’s law during my 
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time frame of interest.53 I added the control variables of interest from the Census’ Annual 
Population Survey, and created my interaction variables.54  
                                                 
53 "Felons Gain Voting Rights In Connecticut ." The New York Times. May 15, 2001 
Tuesday . Date Accessed: 2018/04/02. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.; 
http://archive.fairvote.org/righttovote/Felony%20Dis%20Laws%20in%20the%20US.pdf; 
115 Harv. L. Rev. 1939. Date Accessed: 2018/04/02. 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.; 664 F.2d 391; 1981 U.S. App. LEXIS 
21226. Date Accessed: 2018/04/02. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.; 575 F.2d 
1110; 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 10394. Date Accessed: 2018/04/02. 
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54 As defined by the U.S. Census regions: Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, 
Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas. 
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After I created my dataset, I developed regression models to test my three 
hypotheses, summarized in Table A. To measure the relationship between felon 
disenfranchisement and black voter turnout, I estimate a series of regressions controlling 
for state fixed effects and the additional controls I decided to add. I regress black turnout 
on states’ disenfranchisement codes (my key independent variable) in Model 1 in each of 
my regression tables, and control for several additional variables including the percentage 
of state residents that are black, the mean age of a state's black population, the percentage 
of a state's black residents that have completed some college, and the percentage of a 
state's black residents that live in rural areas in Model 2. I also include state and year 
fixed-effects in all the regression models.  
Table 1 shows the results of my two main regression models for all the states in 
my sample.55 In the first model, I regress eligible black turnout on my main independent 
variable, Disenfranchisement Code. The coefficient for this model is small, positive, and 
insignificant. In the second model, I regress turnout on my main independent variable and 
add controls for the percentage of a state’s population that is black, the median age of a 
state’s black population, the percentage of a state’s black population that have completed 
some college, and the percentage of a state’s black population that lives in rural areas (my 
controls for black population share, median age, education level, and urbanization 
respectively). While the results of this model are still statistically insignificant, they are 
larger and in the expected negative direction. I do not find a significant correlation 
between the proportion of a state’s population that is black and black turnout. However, 
                                                 
55 All models include state and year fixed effects. 
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as expected, the correlations between the controls for median age, level of education 
completed, and percent living in rural areas and black voter turnout are all significant at 
the .05 level of analysis. Interestingly, when I include my control variables, the 
coefficient of my key independent variable becomes negative, and higher in magnitude. 
While it is not a statistically significant effect, it is in the direction predicted by my first 
hypothesis.  
Table 1 – Regression Models for All States, All Scores 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Turnout Turnout 
   
Disenfranchisement Code 0.167 -0.317 
 (0.695) (0.691) 
% Black  19.268 
  (15.251) 
Median age (blacks)  0.229** 
  (0.096) 
% College degree (blacks)  17.577*** 
  (6.150) 
% Rural (blacks)  -16.481*** 
  (4.063) 
Constant 43.013*** 45.403*** 
 (2.241) (4.124) 
   
Observations 611 611 
R-squared 0.636 0.658 
Number of States 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In Table 2, I run two additional regression models to test my second hypothesis, 
that the negative effect of states’ felon disenfranchisement scores on eligible black 
turnout may be non-linear. In these models, I regress eligible black turnout on each of my 
disenfranchisement code scores to test if having a higher score depresses turnout among 
eligible black voters more than in states with low scores. By isolating individual scores in 
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these models, I am also able to address the potential that the effects of felon 
disenfranchisement laws on eligible black turnout are non-linear. In the first model, I find 
negative (though insignificant) coefficients across the range of disenfranchisement 
scores, and modestly significant effects for states in which felons are never re-
enfranchised, even after completion of their sentence (a score of five). The effect size for 
a score of five is almost three times larger than the effect sizes for any other score, and 
the levels of significance across scores indicates that eligible black voter turnout is 
effected significantly by felon disenfranchisement laws only in states where laws are 
most severe. In the second model, I regress voter turnout on each disenfranchisement 
score and add the control variables from model two. As in the first model, each score has 
a negative coefficient, the coefficient for a score of five is statistically significant at the 
.01 level, and the significance of the control variables persists, as in the second model of 
Table 1. These results suggest that, when all felons and ex-felons are disenfranchised, the 
resulting dilution of the political efficacy and power of the communities into which they 









Table 2 – Regression Models for All States, Individual Scores 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Turnout Turnout 
   
Discode = 1 -2.479 -1.970 
 (3.206) (3.142) 
Discode = 2 -5.650 -6.005 
 (4.235) (4.146) 
Discode = 2.5 -1.781 -3.325 
 (4.244) (4.164) 
Discode = 3 -2.573 -3.552 
 (4.548) (4.459) 
Discode = 4 -4.426 -5.862 
 (4.297) (4.224) 
Discode = 4.5 -2.555 -4.235 
 (4.393) (4.326) 
Discode = 5 -12.481* -12.519* 
 (6.716) (6.586) 
% Black  15.471 
  (15.316) 
Median age (blacks)  0.227** 
  (0.096) 
% College degree (blacks)  15.321** 
  (6.196) 
% Rural (blacks)  -15.239*** 
  (4.111) 
Constant 47.743*** 50.085*** 
 (3.900) (5.100) 
   
Observations 611 611 
R-squared 0.646 0.664 
Number of States 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Next, I explore my third hypothesis – that the magnitude of turnout depression 
among eligible black citizens will be greater in states historically associated with targeted 
disenfranchisement of black citizens. I test three different regression models for different 
definitions of southern states, based on the different implications each model may capture 
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should the results be significant. The first model is a repetition of model two in Table 1, 
and simply tests the effects of the severity of states’ felon disenfranchisement laws on 
eligible black turnout. The second model tests for additional effects in Southern states, as 
defined by the U.S. Census, using an interaction term because there is strong historical 
evidence that felon disenfranchisement laws may be particularly seen as an effort to 
repress the black vote in Southern states. Additionally, black populations are generally 
higher in Southern states, so dilution effects may be more concentrated in the South (see 
Appendix A). Previous research has suggested that there are significant differences 
between former Confederate states and “rim states” in the South (Delaware, Maryland, 
Kentucky, Oklahoma, and West Virginia). Given the political power of Confederate 
states in the “solid South” bloc during the era in which many felon disenfranchisement 
laws were re-passed, the third model tests for the additional effect of being a member of 
the former confederacy on eligible black turnout using a second interaction term. Finally, 
the fourth model tests for the additional effect of being a state targeted by the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, using a third interaction term. As these states had been targeted by 
the federal government specifically because of their attempts to disenfranchise their black 
citizens, I expect law severity to be highest for these states, and for the dilution effects of 
felon disenfranchisement laws on eligible voters to be strongest. All models include my 
additional controls for black population share, median age, education level, and 
urbanization, as well as state and year fixed effects.  
Table 3 shows the results for my first regression models with interactions for 
Southern states, former Confederate states, and states targeted by the Voting Rights Act. 
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Column 1 shows the results of the first model, with effects for all states and the additional 
controls, which remain the same as those in Table 1. Column 2 shows the results for the 
regression model including interaction effects for Southern states. The coefficient for 
non-Southern states loses its negative direction and remains statistically insignificant, but 
the coefficient for the Southern interaction term is negative and significant at the .05 level 
of analysis. This suggests that as the severity of a state’s felon disenfranchisement laws 
increases, black turnout decreases only in the Southern states. The effects of the 
additional controls in this model behaved as expected – while, as in Tables 1 and 2, 
states’ black population proportions had no significant effect on eligible black turnout, 
the effect of those populations’ median ages on turnout is significant at the .05 level of 
analysis, and the effects of the controls for educational attainment, and urbanization are 
significant at the .01 level.  
Column 3 shows the results for the regression model including interaction effects 
for former Confederate states. The regression coefficient for states that were not members 
of the former Confederacy remained statistically insignificant, but the coefficient for the 
Confederate state interaction term was negative and modestly significant. This suggests 
that the negative relationship between eligible black turnout and the severity of states’ 
felon disenfranchisement laws is also exacerbated in former Confederate states, although 
less so than in the complete Southern region. Column 4 shows the results for the final 
regression model which included an interaction term to test for the additional effects of 
being a state targeted by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As in the first two interaction 
models, the regression coefficient for states not targeted by the VRA is statistically 
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insignificant. However, as in the first two models, the coefficient for the interaction term 
was statistically significant, in this case at the .01 level of analysis. These results indicate 
that among states targeted by the Voting Rights Act, felon disenfranchisement laws have 
a strong, negative effect eligible black voter turnout. Models 3 and 4 also included the 
additional controls for black population demographics, all of which retained the same 
levels of significance as those in Model 2. The inclusion of these additional variables as 
well as my ability to control for state and year fixed effects give the results of my 
regressions strong causal leverage, and allow me to infer that the significant decreases in 
eligible black voter turnout in different subsets of Southern states are the result of these 
states’ felon disenfranchisement laws, providing strong evidence validating my third 













Table 3 – Regression Models for All States w/Geographic Interactions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Turnout Turnout Turnout Turnout 
     
Disenfranchisement Code -0.317 1.574 0.977 1.348 
 (0.691) (1.174) (0.958) (0.888) 
Discode w/South Interaction  -2.876**   
  (1.444)   
Discode w/Confederate 
Interaction 
  -2.629* 
(1.352) 
 
     
Discode w/VRA Interaction    -4.101*** 
    (1.388) 
% Black 19.268 17.006 21.653 22.959 
 (15.251) (15.252) (15.262) (15.195) 
Median age (blacks) 0.229** 0.193** 0.207** 0.194** 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) 
% College degree (blacks) 17.577*** 16.972*** 17.601*** 17.289*** 
 (6.150) (6.141) (6.135) (6.108) 
% Rural (blacks) -16.481*** -17.148*** -16.651*** -16.262*** 
 (4.063) (4.066) (4.054) (4.035) 
Constant 45.403*** 46.448*** 45.409*** 45.059*** 
 (4.124) (4.146) (4.114) (4.097) 
     
Observations 611 611 611 611 
R-squared 0.658 0.660 0.660 0.663 
Number of States 46 46 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to add to the literature on the extended effects of 
felon disenfranchisement by exploring the potential effects of felon and ex-felon 
disenfranchisement laws on eligible black turnout. The results discussed in the previous 
section not only provide additional evidence for the discriminatory effects of mass 
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incarceration on black communities more broadly, they have important implications in 
the context of the politics of law and order and the justness of civil death. As mentioned 
previously, current estimates of the United States’ felon and ex-felon populations suggest 
that almost six million people (or one in forty adults) have been disenfranchised either 
temporarily or permanently because of a criminal conviction, and over half of these 
adults are black. However, the development of the “color blind court” during the rise of 
the “carceral state” in the 1970s and ‘80s led to the failure of many legal challenges to 
“race-neutral” state felon disenfranchisement laws. While the American public at large 
has begun to scrutinize the racial disparities in criminal justice outcomes – racially 
disproportionate prison populations, recidivism rates, the effects of the war on drugs, etc. 
– the practice of “civil death” via the disenfranchisement of current and former felons 
(including those on and off parole and/or probation) has gone largely unchallenged by the 
court. The consequences of civil death policies are broad and far reaching, and the 
exclusion of felon disenfranchisement laws from strict judicial scrutiny under the 
Fourteenth Amendment allowed southern states, including those explicitly targeted by the 
Voting Rights Act, to subvert institutional protections of black enfranchisement via their 
prison systems.  
Defenders of felon disenfranchisement, and of civil death more generally, frame 
their arguments around the belief that those who have committed crimes should be 
excluded from political agency because their lack of “moral competence” translates to a 
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lack of political competence.57 However, there is strong evidence that many of the 
criminal justice outcomes and law enforcement policies in states have at least some basis 
in racialized politics. This evidence in conjunction with previous evidence of black 
Americans’ reliance on group political efficacy for mobilization and turnout, the 
inequities of political resources in many black-majority areas, the importance of the 
expressive benefits of voting to black turnout, and the massive inequities in criminal 
justice outcomes in the United States, the upholding of felon disenfranchisement laws 
under the argument that it is a just and race-neutral punishment for those that have chosen 
to commit a crime is problematic. The findings in this paper raise an additional problem – 
the disproportionate incarceration of black Americans and their subsequent 
disproportionate exclusion from political participation lowers the political efficacy of 
their communities, and dilutes the political force of eligible black voters. These extended 
effects call into question the justification of felon and ex-felon disenfranchisement laws 
on the grounds that they only impact those who have chosen to commit crimes. 
In the wake of the unprecedented spike in incarceration rates in the United States 
since the 1980s, and the undisputed discriminatory penal outcomes by race, the use of 
“civil death” in a practical sense, regardless of the anecdotal “morality” of its purpose, 
has served only to preserve the socio-economic and political supremacy of white voters’ 
interests. Felon disenfranchisement is just another facet of this broader complex, as 
evidenced by its impacts on eligible black voters who are supposed to be protected via 
                                                 
57 Dinan, J. (2007). The Adoption of Criminal Disenfranchisement Provisions in the 
United States: Lessons from the State Constitutional Convention Debates. Journal of 
Policy History,19(3), 282-312. 
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the constitution and the Voting Rights Act. The Court’s sanction of the practice in the 
years prior to the development of the prison industrial system has allowed states known 
for their efforts to exclude black voters from exercising their right to vote to effectively 
maintain their systems of oppression by allowing them to “constitutionally” subvert the 
protections provided for by the Voting Rights Act through strict felon and ex-felon 
disenfranchisement laws, and perpetuate the discriminatory results of these laws among 
eligible black voters. The statistically significant effects of states’ felon 
disenfranchisement laws on eligible turnout when accounting for the additional effects of 
being a Southern state suggest that, in places historically known for attempting to prevent 
black citizens from exercising their right to vote, these laws are still having their intended 
discriminatory effects. Additionally, the negative and significant effect of being a former 
Confederate state on the relationship between states’ felon disenfranchisement laws and 
eligible black voter turnout suggests that the discriminatory effects of this Jim Crow Era 
measure have extended through the present and continue to dilute the political agency of 
potential voters who have never committed a crime. These effects, as well as the 
significant effects of felon disenfranchisement laws in states specifically targeted by the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, suggest that a reconsideration of the effectiveness of the 
Voting Rights Act is in order, as is the qualification of felon disenfranchisement laws as 
“race neutral.” 
The original Voting Rights Act gave the federal government unilateral power to 
intervene in the election administration of state and local governments. It also 
controversially designated the entire states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
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South Carolina, and the Commonwealth of Virginia, as well as 40 out of 100 counties in 
North Carolina, as “covered jurisdictions.”  A state or county government was considered 
a “covered jurisdiction” if it had implemented any discriminatory test or device, or if the 
voting registration and turnout rates among the eligible voting population in the 
presidential election of 1964 was lower than 50%. These jurisdictions needed 
preclearance from the federal government for any change in any law that could affect 
public elections, and, on the request of residents, federal officials could step in to review 
the voter registration process and monitor the elections. Thus, the goal of the Voting 
Rights Act was to prevent segregationist governments in the South from disenfranchising 
minorities via discriminatory laws or state sponsored intimidation.58  
However, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was ill-equipped to deal with the issue of 
vote dilution via the “race neutral” policies, like felon disenfranchisement laws, that had 
survived the courts’ strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.59 
Even after Congress passed a string of amendments to the Voting Rights Act in 1982, 
including an amendment to the language of Section 2 to was to emphasize the Act’s 
original intent that "violations of the [Act] could be established by showing the 
discriminatory effect (emphasis added) of the challenged practices at issue,”61 language 
excluding those “participating in rebellion or other crimes” from protection remained 
                                                 
58 Harada, M. (2012). The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Strategic Policy Making in the 
South. State Politics & Policy Quarterly,12(4), 458. 
59 Williamson, Richard A. "The 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act: A Statutory 
Analysis of the Revised Bailout Provisions." Wash. ULQ 62 (1984): 1. 
61 Hench, Virginia E. (1998). The death of voting rights: The legal disenfranchisement of 
minority voters. Case Western Reserve Law Review, 48(4), 746-747. 
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unchallenged. The use of this phrase to continually exclude current and former felons 
from constitutional protection meant that the damning statistics about racially 
disproportionate prison populations cannot be used to establish the potential for these 
unequal outcomes to affect the political agency of eligible voters in black communities 
affected by the inequities of the criminal justice system.  However, the results of this 
study indicate that there is significant depression in eligible black turnout in areas where 
state felon disenfranchisement laws are most severe. These effects are further perpetuated 
in Southern states by other, non-statutory barriers such as the psychological effects of 
historic exclusion from enfranchisement and other forms of political participation, 
depressed turnout due to fear of violence from white supremacists, and a general lack of 
political efficacy in black communities in these states.62  
The extensive and punitive system of social and legal penalties for committing 
crimes has transformed the United States penal system into a political and socio-
economic force that has begun to redefine the term “citizenship.” The findings of my 
study provide quantitative evidence for the argument that the power of law enforcement 
institutions as mediators of status identity and belonging cause black people who are still 
eligible to vote, who live in communities affected by high concentrations of criminal 
convictions, to be less likely to turnout or engage in other political or civic activities.63 
While aggregating to the state level is a limitation, evidence of an effect of felon 
                                                 
62 Harvey, A. (1994). Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement and Its Influence on the Black Vote: 
The Need for a Second Look. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 142(3), 1182. 
63 Gottschalk, M. (2015). Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American 
Politics (Course Book.. ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 248. 
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disenfranchisement on eligible voter turnout is an important finding in its own right. 
There is also some evidence that the application of states’ felon disenfranchisement 
policies varies based on the interpretation of election officials, but some of this variation 
may be captured via the controls for state and year fixed effects.64 In general, this work 
suggests the need for future research at a more disaggregated level to determine whether 
these state-level effects are robust to inclusion of intra-state community or individual 
fixed effects, which are beyond the scope of the current work.   
  
                                                 
64 Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 S. Ct. 2655, 41 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1974). 
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Northeast  Midwest  South  West  
Average Score: 1.33 Average Score: 2.13 Average Score: 3.35 Average Score: 2.48 
Connecticut 2.35 Indiana 1.03 Delaware 3.83 Arizona 4.18 
Maine 0 Illinois 1.03 Florida 4.32 Colorado 2.06 
Massachusetts 0.47 Michigan 1.03 Georgia 2.63 Idaho 2.32 
New Hampshire 1.03 Ohio 1.03 Maryland 3.54 New Mexico 4.03 
Rhode Island 2.47 Wisconsin 2.47 North Carolina 2.40 Montana 1.03 
Vermont 0 Iowa 3.93 South Carolina 3.49 Utah 0.53 
New Jersey 2.24 Kansas 2.68 Virginia 4.31 Nevada 4.13 
New York 2.07 Minnesota 2.42 West Virginia 2.26 Wyoming 4.04 
Pennsylvania 1.31 Missouri 2.39 Alabama 4.46 Alaska 2.49 
  Nebraska 4.35 Kentucky 4.25 California 2.06 
  North Dakota 1.03 Mississippi 4.28 Hawaii 1.03 
  South Dakota Tennessee 4.24 Oregon 1.03 
    Arkansas 2.18 Washington 3.38 
    Louisiana 1.60   
    Oklahoma 2.42   
    Texas 3.35   
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Disenfranchisement Code w/South 
Interaction 
Confederate States 
Disenfranchisement Code w/Confederate 
Interaction 
States targeted by VRA 
Disenfranchisement Code w/VRA 
Interaction 
% Black 
Median age (for blacks) 
% College (for blacks) 
% Rural (for blacks) 
FIPS State Code 
4 pt. Dis. Code 
8 pt. Dis. Code (no half-steps) 
Dis. Code = 0 
Dis. Code = 1 
Dis. Code = 2 
Dis. Code = 2.5 
Dis. Code = 3 
Dis. Code = 4 
Dis. Code = 4.5 
Dis. Code = 5 
4 pt. Dis. Code w/South Interaction 
4 pt. Dis. Code w/Confederate 
Interaction 
4 pt. Dis. Code w/VRA Interaction 
8 pt. Dis. Code w/South Interaction 
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Year = 1980 
Year = 1981 
Year = 1982 
Year = 1983 
Year = 1984 
Year = 1985 
Year = 1986 
Year = 1987 
Year = 1988 
Year = 1989 
Year = 1990 
Year = 1991 
Year = 1992 
Year = 1993 
Year = 1994 
Year = 1995 
Year = 1996 
Year = 1997 
Year = 1998 
Year = 1999 
Year = 2000 
Year = 2001 
Year = 2002 
Year = 2003 
Year = 2004 
Year = 2005 
Year = 2006 
Year = 2007 
Year = 2008 
Year = 2009 
Year = 2010 
Year = 2011 
Year = 2012 
Year = 2013 
Year = 2014 
Year = 2015 




Appendix D: Robustness Checks 
In this appendix, I provide two alternate ways of operationalizing the severity of a state’s 
disenfranchisement law. These different operationalizations both address different ways 
of thinking about measuring felon disenfranchisement, and provide a robustness check 
for the results of the regression models used in the main paper. I compress and expand 
the independent variable into four-point and eight-point scales respectively, and then run 
regressions similar to those I run when testing for my main effects. I code the compressed 
variable based on the comparative severity of the main disenfranchisement code variable, 
depending on when or if a felon or ex-felon could get their rights restored. The four-point 
scale is as follows: 
  0 – No disenfranchisement 
  1 – Disenfranchised until completion of prison sentence 
2 – Disenfranchised until completion of parole and probation, or rights 
restored within a set number of years after release  
3 – Rights of some or all felons and ex-felons never restored or restored on 
individual application basis 
In the eight-point scale, I simply expand my main independent variable such that 
each step in the score is a full step, rather than including half-steps. My eight-point scale 
is coded as follows:  
0 - No disenfranchisement 
 
1 - Disenfranchisement of felons until end of prison sentence 
 




3 – Disenfranchisement of felons until end of parole and probation 
 
4 - Rights of all ex-felons felons restored w/in period of time after 
sentencing  
 
5 - Rights of some* ex-felons never restored - need to apply on individual 
basis 
 
6 - Rights of all ex-felons never restored - need to apply on individual 
basis 
 
7 - Rights never restored for ex-felons 
 
 Table 1A shows the results of the regression models for my four-point law 
severity scale. I use the same regression models as I employ in Table 3 in the main paper, 
but replace the disenfranchisement code variable with a new variable for the compressed 
scale, and use new variables for geographic interaction effects between my three regions 
of interest and my compressed scale. All the models still include state and year fixed 
effects. Column 1 shows the effects of the four-point disenfranchisement code eligible 
black voter turnout while including my control variables for black population share, 
median age, education level, and urbanization. As in my main model, the effects for felon 
disenfranchisement law severity remain negative and statistically insignificant, the effects 
for black population share remain insignificant, and the coefficients for the other 
demographic control variables remain strong and significant. In the models for Southern 
and Confederate states (Columns 2 and 3 respectively), the coefficients for my interaction 
variables remain negative, but lose their significance. However, in my fourth model, 
                                                 
* some indicating that the disqualifying felonies are listed, or all second+ time offenders 
  
41 
which includes interaction effects for states targeted by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
the coefficient on the interaction effect retains its significance, indicating that, among 
states targeted by the Voting Rights Act, felon disenfranchisement laws maintain a 
strong, negative effect on eligible black voter turnout. The demographic controls retain 
their significance in all the models.  
 
Table 1A – Regression Models for All States, Compressed Dis. Code 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Turnout Turnout Turnout Turnout 
     
4 pt. Disenfranchisement Code -1.782 0.186 -0.368 -0.011 
 (1.163) (1.971) (1.527) (1.467) 
4pt. Code w/South Interaction  -3.018   
  (2.442)   
4pt. Code w/Confederate 
Interaction 
  -3.279 
(2.296) 
 
     
4pt. Code w/VRA Interaction    -4.611** 
    (2.338) 
% Black 18.439 16.495 19.712 20.346 
 (15.232) (15.305) (15.243) (15.222) 
Median age (blacks) 0.235** 0.212** 0.216** 0.205** 
 (0.096) (0.098) (0.097) (0.097) 
% College degree (blacks) 16.861*** 16.704*** 17.066*** 17.052*** 
 (6.153) (6.151) (6.149) (6.137) 
% Rural (blacks) -16.942*** -17.130*** -16.973*** -17.102*** 
 (4.021) (4.022) (4.017) (4.011) 
Constant 48.502*** 48.837*** 48.665*** 48.169*** 
 (4.467) (4.473) (4.464) (4.458) 
     
Observations 611 611 611 611 
R-squared 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.661 
Number of States 46 46 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses 





Table 2A shows the results of the regression models for my seven-point severity 
scale. Using the same set of regression models as Table 1A, I find that my results are 
similar to those in Table 3, as I would expect. Column 1 shows the results of the first 
model, with effects for all states and the additional controls, which remain negative and 
insignificant. Column 2 shows the results for the regression model including interaction 
effects for Southern states. The coefficient for the Southern interaction term is negative 
and significant at the .05 level of analysis. This suggests that the negative effect of a 
state’s felon disenfranchisement law on eligible black turnout persists in Southern States, 
even with the expanded scores. Column 3 shows the results for the regression model 
including interaction effects for former Confederate states. The regression coefficient for 
states that were not members of the former Confederacy remained statistically 
insignificant, but the coefficient for the Confederate state interaction term was negative 
and significant at the .05 level. Column 4 shows the results for the final regression model 
which included an interaction term to test for the additional effects of being a state 
targeted by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As in the first two interaction models, the 
regression coefficient for states not targeted by the VRA is statistically insignificant. 
However, as in the first two models, the coefficient for the interaction term retains its 
significance, in this case at the .01 level of analysis. In all four models, the effects for 
black population share remain insignificant, and the coefficients for the other 
demographic control variables remain strong and significant. These results indicate that 
my main results using the 5-point disenfranchisement code are largely robust to changes 
to the main independent variable, and provide further evidence in favor of my assertion 
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that the magnitude of turnout depression is greater in states historically associated with 
targeted disenfranchisement of black citizens. 
 
Table 2A – Regression Models for All States, Expanded Dis. Code 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Turnout Turnout Turnout Turnout 
     
7 pt. Disenfranchisement 
Code 
-0.004 1.358 0.966 1.202 
 (0.460) (0.778) (0.650) (0.591) 
7pt. Code w/South Interaction  -2.082**   
  (0.960)   
7pt. Code w/Confederate 
Interaction 
  -1.904** 
(0.902) 
 
     
7pt. Code w/VRA Interaction    -2.998*** 
    (0.933) 
% Black 19.315 17.376 21.966 23.442 
 (15.254) (15.229) (15.258) (15.179) 
Median age (blacks) 0.227** 0.191** 0.207** 0.196** 
 (0.096) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) 
% College degree (blacks) 17.764*** 16.985*** 17.643*** 17.177*** 
 (6.146) (6.135) (6.127) (6.096) 
% Rural (blacks) -16.145*** -16.999*** -16.368*** -15.772*** 
 (4.072) (4.077) (4.060) (4.039) 
Constant 44.520*** 45.855*** 44.583*** 44.425*** 
 (3.958) (3.993) (3.946) (3.925) 
     
Observations 611 611 611 611 
R-squared 0.658 0.661 0.660 0.664 
Number of States 46 46 46 46 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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